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Cyber threat indicators that can be instantly shared in real-time may often be the only 
mitigating factor between preventing and succumbing to a cyber-attack. Detecting threats in 
cloud computing environment can be even more of a challenge given the dynamic and 
complex nature of hosts as well as the services running. Information security professionals 
have long relied on automated tools such as intrusion detection/prevention systems, SIEM 
(security information and event management), and vulnerability scanners to report system, 
application and architectural weaknesses. Although these mechanisms are widely accepted 
and considered effective at helping organizations stay more secure, each can also have unique 
limitations that can hinder in this regard. Therefore, in addition to utilizing these resources, a 
more proactive approach must be incorporated to bring to light possible attack vectors and 
hidden places where hackers may infiltrate.  
 
This paper shares an insightful example of such lessor known attack vectors by closely 
examining a host routing table cache, which unveiled a great deal of information that went 
unrecognized by an intrusion detection system. Furthermore, the author researched and 
developed a robust mobile app tool that has a multitude of functions which can provide the 
information security community with a low-cost countermeasure that can be used in a variety 
of infrastructures (e.g., cloud, host-based etc.). The designed mobile app also illustrates how 
system administrators and other IT leaders can be alerted of brute force attacks and other 
rogue processes by quickly identifying and blocking the attacking IP addresses. Furthermore, 
it is an Android based application that also uses logs created by the Fail2Ban intrusion 
prevention framework for Linux. Additionally, the paper will also familiarize readers with 
indirect detection techniques, ways to tune and protect the routing cache, the impact of low 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Problem Statement 
Cloud computing supported by the UNIX operating system can be quite complex. This 
is borne out by the fact that information stored on the system is quite frequently stored in 
multiple places. In some cases, this process is automatically accomplished by the operating 
system when a related event occurs. Such is the case when an attempt is made to log into the 
secure shell service on a virtual machine (VM) in a cloud. Typically, the first hop of the route 
being used is recorded in the dynamic routing cache table. In most configurations of UNIX or 
variants such as LINUX (which is used in the study) this table addition occurs automatically 
on the server side and there is little an attacking client process can do to stop it (Benvenuti, 
2006). Detailed information regarding the configuration, operation, and tuning of router cache 
is available from Bernat (2011a) and provides the flexibility to tune the cache to be more 
effective beyond the default settings in identifying attacking routes. Of course, the cache itself 
could be attacked and possibly disabled by a denial of service attack so mechanisms need to 
be in place to protect it Bernat, 2011b). Therefore, its internal settings need to be well thought 
out. For example, the garbage collector settings need to be optimized so the number of cached 
routes cannot grow too large (Nguyen, 2004).   
Nature and Significance of the Problem 
To illustrate this problem, a simplistic example will be delineated below using the 
author’s cloud based VM test-bed. First, an abbreviated routing cache table with numeric 
addresses appears below. In the source column, the value is compared to the whitelist of Ipv4 
addresses. In the first row, the value observed is in the whitelist category as having a valid IP 




IP address via the whois command indicates that it is leased through Digital Ocean. This low 
cost internet service has been used in the past by hackers to devise and test new techniques 
(Munsell, 2014) so it follows that further investigation is warranted. Please note, however, 
that the record includes a contact to report abuse so the ISP is taking some responsibility in 
the event their services are misused. 
buster@bros:/rhome/classes$ route -Cn | more 
Kernel IP routing cache 
Source          Destination     Gateway         Flags Metric Ref    Use Iface 
199.17.59.234   199.17.59.195   199.17.59.195         0      1     4776 eth0 
188.226.139.158 199.17.59.234   199.17.59.234   l     0      0        3 lo 
 
buster@bros:~$ cat whitelist_rt.local 
IP for cloud 199.17.59.0 # Public Class C for all cloud zones 
IP for Parent org 199.17.0.0 # Public Class Cs for parent org 
IP for lo 127.0.0.0 # Loop back on VM 
IP for internal 10.0.0.0 # Private Class A for internal nets 
Ip for internal  192.0.0.0 # Private Class C for internal nets 
buster@bros:~$ whois 188.226.139.158 | more 
% Information related to '188.226.128.0 - 188.226.191.255' 
% Abuse contact for '188.226.128.0 - 188.226.191.255' is 'abuse@digitalocean.com' 
 
inetnum: 188.226.128.0 - 188.226.191.255 
netname:  DIGITALOCEAN-AMS-4 
descr:  Digital Ocean, Inc. 
country:  NL 
 
Figure 1. Abbreviated Routing Cache Table 
The most prevalent type of attack on this VM is a brute force secure shell attack. 
Which, for the sake of simplicity, we can assume is detected by and logged by the Fail2Ban 




attempts and once this occurs the offending IP address is locked for 10 minutes. In the 
example below, an address starting with 222 met the intrusion status twice. 
log for Fail2Ban v0.8.6 
2016-01-03 09:05:05,677 Fail2Ban.actions: WARNING [ssh] Ban 222.186.21.73 
2016-01-03 09:15:06,569 Fail2Ban.actions: WARNING [ssh] Unban 222.186.21.73 
2016-01-03 09:16:59,760 Fail2Ban.actions: WARNING [ssh] Ban 222.186.21.73 
2016-01-03 09:27:00,679 Fail2Ban.actions: WARNING [ssh] Unban 222.186.21.73  
 
Figure 2. Failed Login Attempts Log 
However, the 188 address described above does not appear in this log at all, meaning 
that based on this basic logic it is not defined as a security breach event. A quick analysis of 
the authentication log reveals that it tried to connect via the secure shell daemon, but did not 
get back a value from the service that could be capitalized upon and so it never returned an 
authentication response. This scenario was repeated three times within a couple of hour’s 
space between the events. This slow and low volume attack scenario is consistent with 
sophisticated hacking techniques designed to minimize the attack footprint (Dev, 2014). 
Further, there were 32 instances of attacks from networks beginning with 188.226 so it may 
be wise to filter out all of that network traffic on a firewall level. 
buster@bros:/var/log$ sudo cat Fail2Ban.log | grep 188 
buster@bros:/var/log$ 
 
buster@bros:/var/log$ sudo cat auth.log | grep 188.226.139 
Jan  5 10:49:21 bros sshd[5189]: Did not receive identification string from 188.226.139.158 
Jan  5 12:50:13 bros sshd[6835]: Did not receive identification string from 188.226.139.158 
Jan  5 15:35:49 bros sshd[8780]: Did not receive identification string from 188.226.139.158 
buster@bros:/var/log$ sudo cat auth.log | grep 188.226. |wc –l      32 




So, based on the scenario described above, it is clear that evaluating the router cache 
can provide an additional tool to identify hacking attacks that may not be picked up by an 
intrusion detection system that might not be tuned to be overly sensitive in attempts to 
minimize false positives. As one would expect, developing a methodology that compliments 
existing intrusion detection strategies and provides quick alerts when a non-whitelisted site is 
detected could be a valuable addition to a cloud based security strategy. 
Objective of the Study 
Therefore, this paper will build on the basic attack methodology depicted above and 
implement a mobile application to remotely manage scripts that will evaluate the routing 
cache in relation to a whitelist in real time, send out alerts, log the offending events and 
provide basic performance information about the routing cache. This performance information 
such as table size, hit efficiency, and initial round trip time will be used in part to evaluate 
whether the cache itself has been potentially compromised. While this paper presents an 
interesting security problem, it also provides a series of pertinent hands-on scenarios that 
could be used in an educational environment. For example, the concept of a dynamic table 
look-up is certainly pertinent herein, but permeates throughout computing and computing 
security and once a basic understanding is attained that know ledge could be easily transferred 




Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature 
Indirect Detection Techniques 
One of the problems in devising an effective security strategy on a dynamic system 
such as a cloud is make sure that the detection system is quick and adaptable. In other words, 
attacks against a dynamic system are best detected by another dynamic system. This concept 
is supported by Jichkar and Chandak (2014) in their implementation of a security detection 
system that due to the dynamic topology of the networks any static configuration would not be 
sufficient. The work of Cho, Qu, and Wu (2012) built on this concept by placing the trust 
evaluation from their security schema on a series of dynamic systems they referred to as 
watchdog nodes. These nodes monitor and collect other sensors’ behavior information and are 
tuned to dynamically spot problems within the trust interrelationships. 
The work of Shuo, Jun, Kalbarczyk, and Iyer (2006) used a finite-state machine (FSM) 
approach to decompose programs into multiple elementary activities and used an indirect 
analysis of those activities to ascertain the vulnerability of the originating program. This is 
consistent with the prior references in this section in that a finite state machine can be used to 
model complex logic in dynamic systems. In this case, the FSM analysis pinpoints common 
characteristics among a broad range of security vulnerabilities: predictable memory layout, 
unprotected control data, and pointer taintedness. As one would expect, the solution lies in a 
more dynamic resource allocation approach which would randomize vulnerable areas such as 
memory layout.  
The work of Saha, Lukyanenko, and Ylä-Jääski (2015), while not directly security 




implemented a new distributed architecture to efficiently use network-wide cache storage 
space based on a distributed caching algorithm. In the current paper the indirect detection 
system is based only on the router cache of a single host. In systems, which used the proposed 
method of Saha et al. (2015), the scope could easily be expanded form a single host to an 
entire cloud. The white list of known networks would just need to expand beyond those 
trusted by the host to those trusted by the cloud. 
Tuning the Routing Cache 
For quite some time, hackers have seen the value in attacking the routing structure 
within internets (Meyer & Partan, 2003). One simple ploy would be to launch some type of 
denial of service attack. Besides sound isolation of the routing tables, a good strategy to 
combat this scenario is to keep the cache well-tuned. This is in part measurable by looking at 
the percent of requests that are actually handled by the routing cache and do not require that 
packets be sent out to resolve the route, which is much slower. An abbreviated example from 
the author’s cloud below reveals that the cache is tuned fairly efficiently because ~95% of the 
incoming requests are being cached (100 - (2053864 / 43539507) *100)). The outgoing 
requests reach a similar efficiency with a hit percentage of ~97%.  
buster@bros:~$  lnstat -s1 -i1 -c-1 -f rt_cache 
|rt_cache|rt_cache| |rt_cache|rt_cache| 
|  in_hit|in_slow_| | out_hit|out_slow| 
|43539507| 2053864| |11315044|  325675| 
 
Figure 4. Tuned Routing Cache 
The work of Snader and Borisov (2008) provided an excellent example of what can 




that when routing tunnels are allocated with limited resources this allows a malicious router 
operator to attack such tunnels. If the tuning metrics used are insensitive to relative load, the 
system does not adequately respond to changing conditions. This situation results in unreliable 
performance which may drive many users away. 
While Bernat (2011a) stated that when Linux is used as a router, the inefficiency of the 
route cache can hinder the performances of your host he also states that information on how to 
tune that cache is scarce and it is difficult to find up-to-date information on how the route 
cache works. Of course, this makes tuning it problematic. As often is the case with mundane 
computing topics, O’Reilly Publishing comes to the rescue with “Understanding Linux 
Network Internals” (Benventuti, 2006). Specifically, Chapter 33 deals with these issues. 
However, Bernat (2011a) provided a decent overview in regard to the basic of tuning router 
cache to help ensure secure operations. Specifically, decisions need to be made in regard to 
setting the hash table size, target average length of the queue, delay between garbage 
collection runs and when to remove an outdated entry. Of special note from a security 
perspective is the importance of tuning the garbage collection process which helps makes sure 
that unused resources are recovered in real time which lessens the impact of a denial of 
service attack.  
Protecting the Routing Cache 
Authors Zhang, Mao, and Wang (2007) discussed the need to protect against routing 
misbehaviors by using route normalization to protect local network traffic from erroneous and 
malicious routing traffic. Backbone network elements such as intrusion detection systems, 




routing cache. If it goes awry, then the whole network can be compromised, therefore, it’s 
paramount to protect routing caches due to its inherent trustworthiness. Zhang et al. (2007) 
also explain how using a RouteNormalizer that mitigates violations with routing loops, 
missing mandatory attributes, nexthop violations, and export policy violations can mitigate 
and detect routing anomalies too.  
Impact of Low and Slow Hacking Techniques 
Even the most robust intrusion detection systems can be deceived by the low and slow 
hacking techniques that stay just enough under the radar yet often do the most damage.  This 
is one of the main reasons why tuning and protecting the routing cache is vital to seeking out 
hidden places malicious hackers can lurk. An example of such surreptitious tactics is found in 
advanced persistent threats (APT’s). APT’s take “a low-and-slow approach” using social 
engineering “to gain access to a network and steal information quietly” (Teller, 2012). 
Symantec (n.d.) described APT’s as, “An advanced persistent threat uses multiple phases to 
break into a network, avoid detection, and harvest valuable information over the long term. 
This information below details the attack phases, methods, and motivations that differentiate 
APTs from other targeted attacks” (¶ 1). Symantec further explained how APT’s are carried 
out using the following methodology: 
1. Incursion. Attackers break into network by using social engineering to deliver 
targeted malware to vulnerable systems and people.  
2. Discovery. Once in, the attackers stay very much under the radar to avoid 
detection. They then map the organization’s defenses from the inside and create a 




3. Capture. Attackers then access unprotected systems and capture information over 
an extended period. They may also install malware to secretly acquire data or 
disrupt operations.  
4. Exfiltration. Captured information is sent back to attack team’s home base for 
analysis and further exploitation fraud and/or worse. 
Larry Clinton, President of Internet Security Alliance (2013), described APT’s as 
highly skilled, day job hackers who are going to get into systems and they are very persistent. 
Additionally, Clinton (2013) described how they “stay for dinner and breakfast and don’t ever 
go away. They’re going to go quiet and companies will think they’re gone but they are not. 
They’re not interested necessarily in taking down a system but rather using and gathering 
information about company systems and will “call home” with new information to advance 
their threat. They are very skilled at hiding under the radar of anti-virus software.  They are 
usually going after a company’s Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), interested in identity thefts, wire 
fraud and harvesting other types of classified information (Clinton, 2013)  
Need for Mobile App Management in a Cloud 
Given that attacks against routing resources can be disastrous and must be dealt with 
in a timely manner, the interface used to alert the system administrator to such attacks must be 
agile (Cho et al., 2012). Therefore, the goal of any remote system administration management 
software should be to facilitate ease of use, speed and security. Because equipment rooms are 
seldom staffed anymore, the logical solution is to provide management capabilities from a 
mobile device. In the paper herein, the examples are based on Linux platforms and it therefore 




are several mobile apps available, but typically they depend on ssh or some type of remote 
virtual terminal program to gain access to the operating system. This situation would require 
that the appropriate command be entered, which may not be all that fast given the keyboard 
characteristics of some mobile devices (Geier, 2015). However, as previously stated a mobile 
device will be critical in an obtaining an effective solution because it is readily available and 
easily accessible.  
The primary goals in adapting a mobile device to support the remote identification (via 
the router cache) and mitigation of brute force attacks are typically related to identifying and 
quickly blocking the attacking IP addresses, the ease of use, and, of course, added security. In 
the case of not meeting these goals, then the solution would provide limited value. A similar 
security APP was devised by Guster, Abdul, and Rice (2015) except it was designed to 
identify and mediate rogue processes. 
In that case, the challenge was to protect the system while a true decision about the 
offending rogue process was being made by the system admin. Of course, this decision will 
take time certainly the mobile APP approach would minimize some of the end-to-end delay 
associated with logging in remotely via a virtual terminal program or a browser. In such cases 
there will be some degree of asynchronous human think time. In Guster et al. (2015), a 
strategy was pursued to just suspend the rogue process, and then if required, killed by the sys 
admin via the mobile app. A similar approach will be applied herein where the block is 




Chapter III: Methodology 
Because quickness of analysis is critical, the Android mobile application strategy 
facilitates the availability of information pertaining to basic router cache performance 
information, incursions recorded in logs, and the efficiency of the routing cache configuration. 
To evaluate the implementation in an effective manner, the design will be presented in the 
following modules: 
1. Efficiency of the router cache 
2. Evaluating Routing cache from a mobile application 
3. Authentication logs 
4. Fail2Ban logs  
a. Push notification for Fail2Ban Logs 
b. Inserting records to database 
5. Mitigating VM Denial of Service from a mobile application. 
a. Identifying Sub-Targets 
b. Tying the Sub-Targets Together with a PID 
 
c. Identifying a Strategy for Killing PIDs from a Mobile Device 
d. Proactively Identify a Rogue Process 
e. Server side 
 
f. Client Side 
 





Figure 5. Mobile App – Routing Cache 
All the modules above are discussed from two different perspectives: the client side 
(Mobile application) and Server side (Linux Host). The server side is implemented using shell 
scripts and PHP scripts. 
Efficiency of the Router Cache 
The router cache efficiency can be determined for outgoing and incoming connections. 
So the efficiency of the router cache is calculated on the server side. The PHP script on the 
server side fetches the cache from the following location “/proc/net/stat/rt_cache.” The output 
is not structured. So, to parse this data, we have identified common delimiters like a comma, 
dot, pipe, etc. This PHP script also exposes a REST API so as to consume it on the mobile 





Figure 6.  PHP Script for Efficiency of Router Cache 
Below, the strategy for calculating the in and out router cache efficiency is implemented in the 
REST API. 
Incoming efficiency: 
in_efficiency = 100 – (rt_cache_in_slow_tot/rt_cache_in_hit)*100 
Outgoing efficiency: 
Out_efficiency = 100 – (rt_cache_out_slow_tot/rt_cache_out_hit)*100 
 






Figure 7.  Mobile App – Evaluating the Routing Cache 
The routing cache can be viewed by commands “route -Cn” or “netstat -Cnre”.  The 




basically be considered as Whitelisted IP addresses. Those networks not listed may or may not 
become a blacklisted address, but this APP would alert the system administrator to evaluate 
their presence (typically via a script).The initial evaluation of routing cache is done by 
comparing source ip address from output of “route -Cn” with the IPs that are listed in 
whitelist_rt.local. Since, the data is not structured we use the same strategy as above to parse 
the data. The PHP script exposes a REST API which returns the data in JSON format, which 
allows us to work with objects. 
URL: http://<server>/cache.php 
Method: GET 
URL Params: <none> 





 The script below provides the logic and implementation strategy for evaluating the 
routing cache: 
 




 The above parse_ip function takes only a single argument such as the IP address and 
then compares it with the IPs stored in ‘whitelist_rt.local’. The comparison is done by 
checking the net portion of whitelisted IP address against the source IP address in the router 
cache. In PHP the strops (string operations) returns the first occurrence of the substring. If the 
IP address is not a substring then it is listed as blacklisted for this phase.  It returns a ‘1’ if the 
IP is blacklisted and ‘0’ if not.   
Authentication Logs 
The authentication logs are useful for evaluating user login patterns and determining 
when sudo commands are invoked. This “auth log” file can be accessed at /var/log/auth.log. In 
addition this log is useful for identifying malicious activities. Besides the convenience 
displaying information on a mobile application is better approach because the auth.log data is 
not structured. Of course, it is easy to impose structure within the mobile app display. The 
strategy for parsing the data is similar to the examples above which use delimiters like space, 
periods, pipes and so forth. The server also uses a REST API which returns a JSON array. 
URL: http://<server>/auth_log.php 
Method: GET 
URL Params: <none> 
Header: Authorization: Basic + Base64(encrypt(username):encrypt(password)) 
Response:  [{"timestamp":"Feb  1 11:01:02","log":"php1 CRON[5453]  pam_unix(cron session)  session closed for 
user smmsp"},{"timestamp":"Feb  1 11:09:01","log":"php1 CRON[5473]  pam_unix(cron session)  session opened 














Figure 9. Imposing Structure for Authentication Logs on the Mobile App 
Fail2Ban Logs 
The Fail2Ban logs are created by Fail2Ban intrusion prevention framework. These 
logs can be found on /var/logs/Fail2Ban.log. Also, these logs are unstructured. So, to make 
this log meaningful and secure, we have created a script which copies of records to a MySQL 
database. To do this in Fail2Ban framework, we need to create an action that will trigger a 
script which writes data to MySQL whenever a ban or unbanned event has occurred. This 
configuration file is located at /etc/Fail2Ban/action.d. For the project herein, the configuration 







Figure 10. Configuration File for Fail2Ban 
The above configuration will call ban.php and unban.php whenever ban and unban of 
IPs occur respectively. Both the scripts evaluate one argument: ip-address. 
 Lastly, we transfer the information in “qshield.conf” into “jail.local” which is the 
configuration file for the Fail2Ban framework. This configuration file has jails for various 
protocols like http,ftp,ssh etc. Since this paper is concerned about ssh, we have created a jail 
only to ban ssh. Below is a sample the configuration file. 
[ssh] 
 
enabled  = true 
port     = ssh 
filter   = sshd 
logpath  = /var/log/auth.log 
maxretry = 3 
action = qshield 
 
These logs are integrated into the mobile application by using a REST API. In this 
case, the log files didn’t need to be parsed because they are already stored on the database. So, 
a simple “get” query could be used to retrieve the data.  
URL: http://<server>/Fail2Ban.php 
Method: GET 
URL Params: <none> 
Header: Authorization: Basic + Base64(encrypt(username):encrypt(password)) 
Response:  [{"id":"16","status":"ban","ip":"199.17.59.234","timestamp":"2016-02-06 






mestamp":"2016-02-06 14:15:53","OrgName":"Minnesota State Colleges and Universities","Address":"30 7th 









Figure 11.  Configuration File Integrated into the Mobile App 
Push notification for Fail2Ban Logs. The push notification is a message which is 
delivered by the server to the mobile application automatically without any need for a request 
from the mobile application. In the implementation herein, the push notification is used to 












The mobile device will register with the Google Cloud Messaging server (GCM) upon 
successful login to the application. If the registration is successful, the GCM will return a 
device id which is a unique id to identify the device and application within the cloud. To send 
a notification to a mobile application, this device ID is imperative. To facilitate future 
development and in the spirit of event logging this device ID is being saved in a MySQL 
database. This process is accomplished when the registration API is called. To send 
notifications, a script called notify.php was created which in turn has a function called 
“notify” containing the arguments message and the IP-address that are captured from 
Fail2Ban.The ban.php and unban.php files which are discussed above call this “notify” 
function along with the arguments message and IP-address. Below is the format of a request 
to the GCM server. 
URL:https://android.googleapis.com/gcm/send 
Method: POST 
URL Params: <none> 
Header: Authorization: key=YOUR_API_KEY, Content-Type: application/json 


















Figure 13. Push Notifications for Fail2Ban Logs 
Inserting records to database. The idea behind this strategy is to secure the logs. It is 
similar to taking backups of Fail2Ban logs. This strategy will be more efficient if the database 
is on some other remote server. But, in our design, for the sake of convenience, we have used 
same host as where Fail2Ban is installed. This database can be used to create the REST API 
that can be consumed on the mobile application. To make this data more meaningful, we have 
included the location, host organization, etc. of the IP-address. To achieve this we have used 
“dig” command. Below is the function that takes the one argument IP-address and returns the 







Figure 14. Inserting Records To Database 
Mitigating VM Denial of Service from a Mobile Application 
Identifying sub-targets. Denial of Service attacks (DoS) are relatively easy to launch 
and if the target is not prepared, can be very effective. Therefore, it is critical that a potential 
target site devises a well thought out and timely strategy to combat such attacks. DoS have 
been around some time and have become easier to launch with the advent of the Internet 
(Hafner & Lyon, 1996). The Internet, in effect, gave the hacking world the access needed to 
launch DoS attacks remotely with no need to gain physical access to the computer room of the 
target. There are certainly many classi cations of attacks that could originate from the network 
and foundations of which are described by Cheswick and Bellovin (1994). However, all 
attacks will become instantiated in the operating system under one or more process identi 
cation numbers (PID). Properly identifying such attacks requires a sound monitoring strategy 




can tie together the different system resources that might be affected by a DoS attack. 
Commonly, these resources fall into four categories: CPU, memory, storage, and network.  
Tying the sub-targets together with a PID. To illustrate this interrelationship, a 
temperature conversion service (which converts Fahrenheit to Centigrade) has been 
instantiated on a VM within a cloud. The Linux netstat (network statistics) command output 
given reveals that it is running on network port 18002 and available from all networks (:::) 
assigned to that host and has been given PID 3224.  
dguster@eros:~$ netstat -apeen | grep java 
tcp6       0      0 :::18002     :::*    LISTEN      1004536945 26213822    3224/java 
 
The next command, ps (display processes) as seen below provides us with the memory 
(MEM) and CPU usage, in both cases they are well below 1% which indicates that this 
process in its present state is not causing either a memory or CPU DoS.  
dguster@eros:~$ ps -aux | grep 3224 
USER       PID %CPU %MEM    VSZ   RSS  TTY     STAT START   TIME COMMAND 
dguster   3224  0.3  0.4 2245236 17656 pts/3   Sl+  14:03   0:02 java TempServer 
 
However, in a cloud architecture using virtualization and symmetric multiprocessing, 
the CPU resources may be distributed across many physical devices. The second ps –ALF 
command below shows us that the original PID 3224 has been broken down into 14 “light 
weight processes” and are assigned to four different processors (PSR) numbered 0-3. While 
the original process 3224 retains the same PID number for the light weight process ID, each 
subsequent light weight process receives a new and different LWP number. However, because 
these are assigned hierarchically. if one were to kill the root level process, in this case 3224, 
the whole process stack would be removed. This fact will become important later in the paper 




about this type of architecture and DoS attack is that the ability to multi-thread tasks and bring 
multiple processors into the fray when a DoS attack occurs makes it much more difficult for a 
DoS attack to be successful. Further, it lengthens the time a system administrator has to kill 
the offending process(s) and mitigate the attack.  
dguster@eros:~$ ps -ALF | grep 3224 
UID        PID  PPID   LWP  C NLWP    SZ   RSS PSR STIME TTY          TIME CMD 
dguster   3224  3120  3224  0   14 561309 17672  3 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3225  0   14 561309 17672  0 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3228  0   14 561309 17672  1 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3229  0   14 561309 17672  2 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3230  0   14 561309 17672  3 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3231  0   14 561309 17672  0 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3232  0   14 561309 17672  0 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3233  0   14 561309 17672  2 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3234  0   14 561309 17672  3 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3235  0   14 561309 17672  1 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3236  0   14 561309 17672  1 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3237  0   14 561309 17672  2 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3238  0   14 561309 17672  1 14:03 pts/3    00:00:00 java TempServer 
dguster   3224  3120  3239  0   14 561309 17672  1 14:03 pts/3    00:00:02 java TempServer 
 
Last, the lsof command (list open files) provides a way of linking the process to 
storage resources. Below we are able to see respectively: the path to a directory on secondary 
storage, a library loaded from secondary storage into memory, a temporary file system 
workspace in memory but writable as a file to secondary storage, a UNIX socket which allows 
the java class to be linked to the operating system and finally a IP version 6 network 
connection linked to port 18002. A bottom up approach would require that each of these 
elements linked to PID 3224 be deleted independently which would more than likely not be 
quick enough to mitigate a modern DoS attack. Therefore, an effective method would be to 
kill the root process, in this case PID 3224, and all sub-processes (sometimes referred to as 
children) would then be eliminated as well. 
dguster@eros:~$ lsof -p 3224 
COMMAND  PID    USER   FD   TYPE             DEVICE SIZE/OFF     NODE NAME 




java    3224 dguster    2u   CHR              136,3      0t0       6 /dev/pts/3 
java    3224 dguster  mem    REG                8,1   149280  715938 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld 2.15.so 
java    3224 dguster  mem    REG                8,1    32768  525582 /tmp/hsperfdata_dguster/3224 
java    3224 dguster   12u  unix 0x0000000000000000      0t0 26213820 socket 
java    3224 dguster   13u  IPv6           26213822      0t0      TCP *:18002 (LISTEN) 
Killing the Primary and Secondary PIDs with a Kill Command 
 
Below we see that the process 3224 is killed. Then, a search using the ps –aux “display 
process command” reveals only the search argument using the grep filter. Further, a list of 
open files query returns nothing. So therefore 3224 and its children are no longer instantiated 
on the VM. 
dguster@eros:~$ kill 3224 
dguster@eros:~$ ps -aux | grep 3224 
dguster   6051  0.0  0.0   6500   624 pts/0    S+   15:22   0:00 grep --color=auto 3224 
dguster@eros:~$ lsof -p 3224 
 
Identifying a strategy for killing PIDs from a mobile device. The primary goals in 
adapting a mobile device to support the remote mitigation of DoS attacks are typically related 
to identifying and quickly eliminating rogue PIDs, the ease of use, and, of course, added 
security. If any one of these goals are not met, then the solution would provide limited value. 
In terms of identifying rogue processes there are certain parameters that can be monitored and 
a simple example appears below. A java class is writing a large file into memory and is taking 
up 98.5% of the available memory available for this type of application. Therefore, if this 
mobile management strategy is to be effective this obvious violation has to be identified and 
the associated process (PID 12023) killed in a timely manner. Writing a script or scripts to 
identify such a violation and sending an alert to the mobile device of a system admin would be 
a major step in the success of this type of project. 
dguster@eros:~$ ps -aux | grep java 




In terms of killing the process, once it is identified the problem will then be greatly 
affected by end-to-end transmission delay. Once the command is executed and transmitted to 
the host the delay is relatively minimal, as can be seen in the output below. The task itself 
takes ~ 3.65 milliseconds to run and the elapsed time from command to response is ~ 7.11 
milliseconds.  
dguster@eros:~$ perf stat -B kill -9 12161 
 
 Performance counter stats for 'kill -9 12161': 
 
          3.651294 task-clock                #    0.514 CPUs utilized 
                 1 context-switches          #    0.000 M/sec 
                 1 CPU-migrations            #    0.000 M/sec 
               183 page-faults               #    0.050 M/sec 
     <not counted> cycles 
                 0 stalled-cycles-frontend   #    0.00% frontend cycles idle 
                 0 stalled-cycles-backend    #    0.00% backend  cycles idle 
                 0 instructions              #    0.00  insns per cycle 
                 0 branches                  #    0.000 M/sec                   [19.34%] 
     <not counted> branch-misses 
 
       0.007110059 seconds time elapsed 
 
dguster@eros:~$ ps -aux | grep java 
dguster  12184  0.0  0.0   6500   624 pts/3    S+   10:02   0:00 grep --color=auto java 
 
The challenge then will be to protect the system while a true decision about the 
offending rogue process is being made by the system admin. Once again, this decision will 
take time, although the mobile app approach should minimize some of the end-to-end delay 
associated with logging in remotely via a virtual terminal program or a browser there still will 
be some degree of asynchronous human think time. Therefore, a strategy needs to be pursued 
to have the potentially rogue process suspended by the identifying script and if determined to 
be a rogue process, then killed by the sys admin via the mobile app. In cases in which the 
process is determined not to be a rogue process then it could be restarted from the same APP. 




in place but cannot grow. The LINUX command series in Figure 8 shows how a given process 
can be temporarily disabled and restarted using the kill command. A PID (14439) from a 
potentially rogue process is identified and disabled with the signal stop switch via the kill 
command. When the process is then displayed its status flag changes from S (suspended 
waiting for resources) to T (stopped). In the last part of the results below it is then changed 
back to S (if indeed it is not a rogue process), but of course it could also be killed if it truly is 
a rogue process. This type of logic will need to be incorporated into the design of the mobile 
app to minimize the effect of false positives. 
dguster@eros:~$ ps -aux | grep java 
dguster  14439 38.6 25.7 3271356 1043744 pts/0 Sl+  12:45   0:11 java MemoryMappedFileInJava2 
dguster  14455  0.0  0.0   6500   624 pts/3    S+   12:46   0:00 grep --color=auto java 
 
dguster@eros:~$ kill -SIGTSTP 14439 
 
dguster@eros:~$ ps -aux | grep java 
dguster  14439  8.8 25.7 3271356 1043744 pts/0 Tl   12:45   0:12 java MemoryMappedFileInJava2 
dguster  14463  0.0  0.0   6500   624 pts/3    S+   12:47   0:00 grep --color=auto java 
 
dguster@eros:~$ kill -SIGCONT 14439 
 
dguster@eros:~$ ps -aux | grep java 
dguster  14439  7.3 25.7 3271356 1043744 pts/0 Sl   12:45   0:12 java MemoryMappedFileInJava2 
dguster  14490  0.0  0.0   6500   620 pts/3    S+   12:48   0:00 grep --color=auto java 
 
Proactively identifying a rogue process. In order to effectively manage DoS 
processes it is important to devise a proactive rather than a reactive policy. As state earlier 
there are four main categories of denial of service: CPU, memory, disk and the network. For 
the sake of simplicity, we will focus on the CPU. There are many ways of using the Linux 
tools to identify a process that is overusing CPU resources, but in most cases they are a 
variant of the ps command. To illustrate this process, we picked the method from How to Find 




dguster@eros:~/javaclass$ ps -eo pcpu,pid,user,args | sort -k1 -r | head -10 
%CPU   PID USER     COMMAND 
82.8  3748 dguster  java MemoryMappedFileInJava2 
12.0  3764 root     [flush-0:21] 
 0.1  1395 root     /usr/sbin/vmtoolsd 
 0.0 31281 root     [kworker/0:0] 
 0.0 30824 root     /usr/lib/policykit-1/polkitd --no-debug 
 0.0 30757 root     /usr/sbin/console-kit-daemon --no-daemon 
 0.0 30697 syslog   rsyslogd -c5 
 0.0 30344 root     /usr/sbin/sshd -D 
 0.0 29030 root     [kworker/3:2] 
 
The resulting list displays the 10 processes that are using the most memory. The first 
entry in the list is really problematic in that it is using 82.8% of available memory. Note that 
the Linux operating system has processes in place to help safeguard against a denial of 
service. For example, in the list above, the flush process is freeing memory by writing dirty 
memory pages out to disk. 
Server side. The host in this case is using a popular release of Linux called Ubuntu. 
The services on this host are provided by an Apache Web Server. This service facilitates the 
communication with the mobile application. Also, on this host a MySQL database has been 
configured to provide secondary storage to store the mobile device IDs. Of course a modular 
approach has been used to create the code. Below are all the components of the server which 
are used to implement this application: 
cProc.sh: This bash script is used to restart the stopped process 
register.php: This is the rest API exposed to mobile app used to store the device id of 
the Android Phone in the MySql DB. 
This API accepts the GET Method and takes ‘id’ as an argument. 
unregister.php: This is the rest API exposed to the mobile app used to delete the 




This API accepts the GET Method and takes ‘id’ as an argument. 
db_config.php: This file has the configuration used to connect to the MySQL DB. 
This is not an API and it is used internally by other files which need to connect to DB. 
cronjob.sh: This is a bash script which basically acts a cronjob which calls the 
process.sh every five seconds. 
MCrypt.php: This is a library which uses AES-128 internally for encrypting and 
decrypting data. This is not exposed as API and it is only used internally with other 
files. 
startProcess.php: This is a Rest API which is displayed to the user by the mobile 
application. This is used to start the process. It will internally call the ‘cProc.sh’ 
internally. 
This API accepts the GET Method and takes the ‘pid’ as an argument. 
stopProcess.php: This is a Rest API which is displayed to the user by the mobile 
application. This is used to stop the process. It will internally call the ‘sProc.sh’ 
internally. 
This API accepts the GET Method and takes the ‘pid’ as an argument. 
sProc.sh: This bash script is used to stop the running process. 
killProcess.php: This is a Rest API which is displayed to the user by the mobile 
application. This is used to kill the process. It will internally call the ‘kProc.sh’ 
internally. 




process.sh: This is a bash script which is used to identify the process with a high CPU 
usage. This will also call the ‘kill.sh’ to suspend the process. 
kill.sh: This is a bash script which actually suspends the process and calls the 
‘notify.php’. 
auth.php: This is not an API and it is the authentication library which contains the 
code for HTTP Basic Authentication along with AES-128 encryption. The credentials 
are transmitted as encrypted data. 
notify.php: This is API calls the GCM (Goggle Cloud Messaging) to send the push 
notification. It gets the device ids from the MySQL DB. 
Client side. In our design, the client is an Android Application. This Application has 
two screens i.e. the Login Screen and the Administration screen which appear below as 
screenshots in Figure 2. 
 











Figure 16. Administration Screen 
The Login Screen is simply used to authenticate the application with the server. The 
login screen will be shown only once,. i.e., when the user installs the application. Therefore, 
when the user opens the APP for the second time it will not show the login screen again, 
instead the administration screen would then be displayed. Also, when the user logs in 
successfully for the first time the credentials are encrypted using AES-128 and then stored on 
the mobile device to support future communications.  
Push Notifications for Rouge Process 
Figure 17 illustrates how the push notification is used within this application. 
The push notification, also called the server push notification, is the delivery of information 
from a software application to a computing device, without a specific request from the client. 





After a successful login, the mobile device will register with the GCM, upon a successful 
registration, the GCM will then return a device id to the mobile application. This ID will be 
used to uniquely identify the device within the cloud. The mobile application will then send a 
request to the server along with this device id and then store it in the database (at this point the 






Figure 17. Architecture of Push Notification of Rouge Process 
Next, when the server finds any rogue process it can, it will then send the push 
notification using the device id (again the notify.php api is called to notify the registered 
devices). Of course the object Notify.php has the code needed to send the request to the GCM. 
Below is an example of a request to the GCM: 
GCM API : https://android.googleapis.com/gcm/send 
Method : POST 
Parameters: 
registration_ids : is the array of device ids 
data : is the array of key value pair (Ex: “message” =>”Rogue process found”) 
Header : Authorization: key=”This key can be found on the Google API Console 
 
Below, in Figure 18, is an example of the Android mobile device screenshot after the 












Figure 18. Rouge Process Killed 
Encryption 
Because this project attempted to use object oriented programming whenever possible 
a well-respected library [9] was used for encryption on both the mobile app and the server 
(GitHub, 2014). This library makes use of AES 128. When the mobile application sends a 
request to the server the data is encrypted before being transmitted. For example, one of the 
parameters to be passed would be the process ID which could be considered to be sensitive 
data. So, under this scenario, every process ID is encrypted and then sent over the REST API, 
of course then the, REST API is capable of decrypting the data. 
The Initial Vector and Key both are initially shared between mobile app and the 




String credentials = MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt("raqeeb")) + ":"+ 
MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt("superman2")); 
 
The decryption on the server side is accomplished with the logic below: 
$mcrypt = new MCrypt(); 
$username =$mcrypt->decrypt($user); 
$password = $mcrypt->decrypt($pass); 
 
Authentication for Accessing Mobile Application 
In this application, authentication is done by the HTTP Basic Auth routine in 
conjunction with the AES-128 encryption class. The main file for handling the authentication 
and login API on the server is “auth.php.” Every request from the mobile app is then 
authenticated using that HTTP Basic Auth routine. Following is the example of adding the 
Auth header to the mobile application. Below is the sample java code for a request on client 
side: 
credentials = MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt("raqeeb")) + ":" + 
MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt("superman2")); 
 
String credBase64 = Base64.encodeToString( 
credentials.getBytes(), Base64.DEFAULT).replace("\n",""); 
HttpClient httpclient = new DefaultHttpClient(); 
HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(params[0]); 
httpGet.setHeader("Authorization", "Basic " + credBase64); 
HttpResponse response = httpclient.execute(httpGet); 
 
The above credentials are stored in the persistent memory of mobile device once the user has 
successfully logged in. This facilitates efficiency when evaluating future requests to the 





Figure 19. PHP Code Used for Authentication Requests 
To achieve better security, the username and password have also been encrypted using 
the AES-128 class before being transmitted to the server. In turn, the server will handle this 
request by decrypting and following the rest of the authentication process. A much needed 
future addition to this project would be implementing an administration control panel for 
controlling user accounts within the mobile application. Keeping this in mind the users are 
being stored in a MYSQL table called ‘users’. To ensure added security the passwords are 

















Chapter IV: Conclusion and Future Work 
The results generally indicate that an indirect measurement strategy such as using the 
router cache can detect attacks that may not trip an intrusion detection system. This is due in 
part to trying to minimize false positives within intrusion detection system and the fact that 
hacker have learned to utilize less intense attacks to minimize the probability of getting caught 
and to minimize their foot print from a forensics point of view. The data evaluated revealed 
that scenario. There were typically about 10 attacks per hour that did not trip the intrusion 
detection system, but were caught by the router cache. However, there were also several 
events per hour where the IP address was not on the whitelist and hence was mistakenly 
identified as an attack. Future research by the authors needs to address how the whitelist can 
be expanded beyond the list of current trusted domains. In many cases, outside address are 
related to a service provider such as Charter and Charter related client addresses in the 
authors’ service area could be added to the white list. Also, use of reoccurring client addresses 
if used ethically could be added as well.  
Using the router cache for this purpose places an additional burden on that cache in the 
sense it will get read more often. So it will be important to make sure the cache is well tuned. 
On the authors’ system the virtual machine tested was getting an excellent hit ratio of about 
95% in each direction. This is a good indicator of the health of the configuration and 
hopefully can be maintained when the router cache is also used to identify intrusions.  
Last, for this technique to be viable, a quick and convenient interface is required. It 
makes sense to develop this interface as a mobile app. Equipment rooms are seldom manned 




intrusion could be identified and dealt with remotely. Certainly, this remote management 
would require that sensitive information travel the airways. Therefore, the design presented 
herein attempted to use encryption mechanisms to ensure secure transmission of data. Further, 
it was clear that this security tool could be just one of many that could be managed via a 
mobile app. In fact this is the second tool developed by the authors, see Guster et al. (2015). 
To accommodate such a mission, creating the MYSQL data base as a depository of security 
related data will allow the sharing of such data across multiple security tools deployed as 
mobile apps.  
Hackers are consistently use a dynamic strategy; in other words, they are constantly 
devising new attack techniques and are aware of the importance of minimizing their attack 
fingerprint. Indirect methods such as this can be effective because adding to the routing cache 
table can be viewed as a subsequent event to a primary event such as attacking the secure shell 
daemon. This is an unconventional strategy and a hacker would really need to think outside 
the box to thwart its effectiveness. Ultimately, this makes it more difficult for a hacker to: go 
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public class Login extends Activity { 
 
 Button loginBtn; 
 String SERVER_URL = "http://10.31.7.11/student/paper2/"; 
 WebReq_Return returnInterface; 
 MCrypt mcrypt; 
 EditText uEt, pEt; 
 String username, password; 






 protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
  super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
  setContentView(R.layout.login); 
  settings = PreferenceManager 
    .getDefaultSharedPreferences(getApplicationContext()); 
  String user = settings.getString("username", null); 
  String pass = settings.getString("password", null); 
   
  if(user != null && pass != null){ 
   Intent intent = new Intent(Login.this, 
     MainActivity.class); 
   startActivity(intent); 
   finish(); 
  } 
   
  final Editor edit = settings.edit(); 
  loginBtn = (Button) findViewById(R.id.button1); 
  mcrypt = new MCrypt(); 
  uEt = (EditText) findViewById(R.id.editText1); 





  loginBtn.setOnClickListener(new OnClickListener() { 
 
   @Override 
   public void onClick(View v) { 
    createLogin(); 
 
   } 
  }); 
 
  returnInterface = new WebReq_Return() { 
   @Override 
   public void setResult(String result) { 
    try { 
     JSONObject jo = new JSONObject(result); 
     String code = jo.getString("code"); 
     if (Integer.parseInt(code) == 200) { 
      runOnUiThread(new Runnable() { 
       public void run() { 





        edit.putString("password", 
password); 
        edit.commit(); 
        Intent intent = new 
Intent(Login.this, 
         
 MainActivity.class); 
        startActivity(intent); 
        finish(); 
       } 
      }); 
     } else { 
      runOnUiThread(new Runnable() { 
       public void run() { 
       
 Toast.makeText(getApplicationContext(), 
          "Invalid 
credentials", 
         
 Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show(); 
       } 




     } 
    } catch (JSONException e) { 
     // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
     e.printStackTrace(); 
    } 
   } 




 public void createLogin() { 
  try { 
   username = MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt(uEt.getText() 
     .toString())); 
   password = MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt(pEt.getText() 
     .toString())); 
   Log.d("url", SERVER_URL + "auth.php?user=" + username + 
"&pass=" 
     + password); 
   WebRequest wr = new WebRequest(); 





     + password); 
 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 public class WebRequest extends AsyncTask<String, Void, Void> { 
 
  @Override 
  protected Void doInBackground(String... params) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
   InputStream isr = null; 
   String result = ""; 
   long start, end; 
   start = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   try { 
 
    // create HttpClient 





    HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(params[0]); 
    HttpResponse response = httpclient.execute(httpGet); 
 
    // receive response as inputStream 
    isr = response.getEntity().getContent(); 
 
    // convert inputstream to String 
    BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader( 
      new InputStreamReader(isr, "iso-8859-
1"), 8); 
    StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); 
    String line = null; 
    while ((line = reader.readLine()) != null) { 
     sb.append(line + "\n"); 
    } 
 
    isr.close(); 
    result = sb.toString(); 
 
    Log.d("output", result); 
    end = System.currentTimeMillis(); 




    Log.d("exception", ex.toString()); 
    end = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   } 
   returnInterface.setResult(result); 
   return null; 




 public interface WebReq_Return { 









































public class MainActivity extends Activity { 
 
 EditText pidET; 
 String SERVER_URL = "http://10.31.7.11/student/paper2/"; 
 Button perBtn, authBtn, Fail2BanBtn, cacheBtn; 
 TextView in_eff, out_eff; 
 WebReq_Return returnInterface; 
 MCrypt mcrypt; 
 String credentials, username, password; 
 
 @Override 
 protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
  super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
  setContentView(R.layout.activity_main); 
  GCMRegistrar.checkDevice(this); 
  GCMRegistrar.checkManifest(this); 
  final String regId = GCMRegistrar.getRegistrationId(this); 
  GCMRegistrar.register(getApplicationContext(), 
    GCMIntentService.SENDER_ID); 
 




  Fail2BanBtn = (Button) findViewById(R.id.button2); 
  authBtn = (Button) findViewById(R.id.button1); 
  cacheBtn = (Button) findViewById(R.id.button4); 
  in_eff = (TextView) findViewById(R.id.textView4); 
  out_eff = (TextView) findViewById(R.id.TextView01); 
 
  mcrypt = new MCrypt(); 
 
  perBtn.setOnClickListener(new OnClickListener() { 
 
   @Override 
   public void onClick(View v) { 
    fetchPerformance(); 
 
   } 
  }); 
 
  Fail2BanBtn.setOnClickListener(new OnClickListener() { 
 
   @Override 
   public void onClick(View v) { 




      Fail2Ban.class); 
    intent.putExtra("type", "fail"); 
    startActivity(intent); 
   } 
  }); 
 
  authBtn.setOnClickListener(new OnClickListener() { 
 
   @Override 
   public void onClick(View v) { 
    Intent intent = new Intent(MainActivity.this, 
      Fail2Ban.class); 
    intent.putExtra("type", "auth"); 
    startActivity(intent); 
 
   } 
  }); 
  cacheBtn.setOnClickListener(new OnClickListener() { 
 
   @Override 
   public void onClick(View v) { 




      Fail2Ban.class); 
    intent.putExtra("type", "cache"); 
    startActivity(intent); 
 
   } 
  }); 
 
  returnInterface = new WebReq_Return() { 
   @Override 
   public void setResult(final String result) { 
    runOnUiThread(new Runnable() { 
     public void run() { 
 
      Toast.makeText(getApplicationContext(), 
result, 
       
 Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show(); 
 
     } 
    }); 
 




  }; 
 
  if (getIntent().getExtras() != null) { 
   String message = getIntent().getExtras().getString("name"); 
  } 
 } 
 
 public void fetchPerformance() { 
  try { 
 
   credentials = MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt("raqeeb")) + 
":" 
     + 
MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt("superman2")); 
   Log.d("url", SERVER_URL + "performance.php"); 
   WebRequest wr = new WebRequest(); 
   wr.execute(SERVER_URL + "performance.php"); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
   e.printStackTrace(); 







 public class WebRequest extends AsyncTask<String, Void, String> { 
 
  @Override 
  protected void onPostExecute(String result) { 
   try { 
    JSONObject jo = new JSONObject(result); 
    in_eff.setText("In efficiency:" + 
jo.getString("in_efficency") 
      + "%"); 
    out_eff.setText("Out efficiency:" 
      + jo.getString("out_efficency") + "%"); 
   } catch (JSONException e) { 
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
  }; 
 
  @Override 
  protected String doInBackground(String... params) { 




   InputStream isr = null; 
   String result = ""; 
   long start, end; 
   start = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   try { 
    String credBase64 = Base64.encodeToString( 
      credentials.getBytes(), 
Base64.DEFAULT).replace("\n", 
      ""); 
    // create HttpClient 
    HttpClient httpclient = new DefaultHttpClient(); 
 
    HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(params[0]); 
    httpGet.setHeader("Authorization", "Basic " + 
credBase64); 
    HttpResponse response = httpclient.execute(httpGet); 
 
    // receive response as inputStream 
    isr = response.getEntity().getContent(); 
 
    // convert inputstream to String 




      new InputStreamReader(isr, "iso-8859-
1"), 8); 
    StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); 
    String line = null; 
    while ((line = reader.readLine()) != null) { 
     sb.append(line + "\n"); 
    } 
 
    isr.close(); 
    result = sb.toString(); 
 
    Log.d("output", result); 
    end = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   } catch (Exception ex) { 
    Log.d("exception", ex.toString()); 
    end = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   } 
   String resp = "Response Time" + (end - start) + " millis"; 
   returnInterface.setResult("CMD exe time -" + resp); 
   return result; 


































public class GCMIntentService extends GCMBaseIntentService { 
 
 private static final String TAG = "GCM Tutorial::Service"; 
 private static final String SUrl = "http://10.31.7.11/student/paper2/"; 
 
 // Use your PROJECT ID from Google API into SENDER_ID 
 public static final String SENDER_ID = "1037879414870"; 
 
 public GCMIntentService() { 




 protected void onRegistered(Context context, String registrationId) { 
 
  Log.i(TAG, "onRegistered: registrationId=" + registrationId); 
 





  HttpGet get = new HttpGet(SUrl + "/register.php?id=" + registrationId); 
  try { 
   mClient.execute(get); 
   HttpResponse res = mClient.execute(get); 
 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   // TODO: handle exception 





 protected void onUnregistered(Context context, String registrationId) { 
 
  Log.i(TAG, "onUnregistered: registrationId=" + registrationId); 
  HttpClient mClient = new DefaultHttpClient(); 
 
  HttpGet get = new HttpGet(SUrl + "/unregister.php?id=" + 
registrationId); 
  try { 




   HttpResponse res = mClient.execute(get); 
 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   // TODO: handle exception 





 protected void onMessage(Context context, Intent data) { 
  String message; 
  String message1; 
  String message2; 
 
  // Message from PHP server 
  message = data.getStringExtra("message"); 
  message1 = data.getStringExtra("message1"); 
  message2 = data.getStringExtra("message2"); 
 
  // Starts the activity on notification click 
  int icon = R.drawable.ic_launcher; 




  // NotificationManager notificationManager = (NotificationManager) 
  context.getSystemService(Context.NOTIFICATION_SERVICE); 
  Notification notification = new Notification(icon, message, when); 
 
  String title = context.getString(R.string.app_name); 
 
  Intent notificationIntent = new Intent(context, MainActivity.class); 
  notificationIntent.putExtra("name", message); 
  notificationIntent.putExtra("pid", message1); 
  notificationIntent.putExtra("link", message2); 
 
  // set intent so it does not start a new activity 
  notificationIntent.setFlags(Intent.FLAG_ACTIVITY_CLEAR_TOP 
    | Intent.FLAG_ACTIVITY_SINGLE_TOP); 
  PendingIntent intent = PendingIntent.getActivity(context, 0, 
    notificationIntent, 
PendingIntent.FLAG_UPDATE_CURRENT); 
  notification.setLatestEventInfo(context, title, message, intent); 
  notification.flags |= Notification.FLAG_AUTO_CANCEL; 
 
  // Play default notification sound 





  // Vibrate if vibrate is enabled 
  notification.defaults |= Notification.DEFAULT_VIBRATE; 
  // notificationManager.notify(0, notification); 
  NotificationManager manager = (NotificationManager) 
getSystemService(NOTIFICATION_SERVICE); 
  manager.notify(R.string.app_name, notification); 
 
  { 
   // Wake Android Device when notification received 
   PowerManager pm = (PowerManager) context 
    
 .getSystemService(Context.POWER_SERVICE); 
   final PowerManager.WakeLock mWakelock = 
pm.newWakeLock( 
     PowerManager.FULL_WAKE_LOCK 
       | 
PowerManager.ACQUIRE_CAUSES_WAKEUP, "GCM_PUSH"); 
   mWakelock.acquire(); 
 
   // Timer before putting Android Device to sleep mode. 




   TimerTask task = new TimerTask() { 
    public void run() { 
     mWakelock.release(); 
    } 
   }; 
   timer.schedule(task, 5000); 
 





 protected void onError(Context arg0, String errorId) { 
 




















public class MCrypt { 
 
        static char[] HEX_CHARS = {'0','1','2','3','4','5','6','7','8','9','a','b','c','d','e','f'}; 
 
        private String iv = "fedcba9876543210";//Dummy iv (CHANGE IT!) 
        private IvParameterSpec ivspec; 
        private SecretKeySpec keyspec; 
        private Cipher cipher; 
 
        private String SecretKey = "0123456789abcdef";//Dummy secretKey (CHANGE 
IT!) 
 




        { 
                ivspec = new IvParameterSpec(iv.getBytes()); 
 
                keyspec = new SecretKeySpec(SecretKey.getBytes(), "AES"); 
 
                try { 
                        cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/NoPadding"); 
                } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) { 
                        // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
                        e.printStackTrace(); 
                } catch (NoSuchPaddingException e) { 
                        // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
                        e.printStackTrace(); 
                } 
        } 
 
        public byte[] encrypt(String text) throws Exception 
        { 
                if(text == null || text.length() == 0) 
                        throw new Exception("Empty string"); 
 





                try { 
                        cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, keyspec, ivspec); 
 
                        encrypted = cipher.doFinal(padString(text).getBytes()); 
                } catch (Exception e) 
                {                        
                        throw new Exception("[encrypt] " + e.getMessage()); 
                } 
 
                return encrypted; 
        } 
 
        public byte[] decrypt(String code) throws Exception 
        { 
                if(code == null || code.length() == 0) 
                        throw new Exception("Empty string"); 
 
                byte[] decrypted = null; 
 
                try { 





                        decrypted = cipher.doFinal(hexToBytes(code)); 
                        //Remove trailing zeroes 
                        if( decrypted.length > 0) 
                        { 
                            int trim = 0; 
                            for( int i = decrypted.length - 1; i >= 0; i-- ) if( decrypted[i] == 0 ) 
trim++; 
 
                            if( trim > 0 ) 
                            { 
                                byte[] newArray = new byte[decrypted.length - trim]; 
                                System.arraycopy(decrypted, 0, newArray, 0, decrypted.length - 
trim); 
                                decrypted = newArray; 
                            } 
                        } 
                } catch (Exception e) 
                { 
                        throw new Exception("[decrypt] " + e.getMessage()); 
                } 




        }       
 
 
        public static String bytesToHex(byte[] buf) 
        { 
            char[] chars = new char[2 * buf.length]; 
            for (int i = 0; i < buf.length; ++i) 
            { 
                chars[2 * i] = HEX_CHARS[(buf[i] & 0xF0) >>> 4]; 
                chars[2 * i + 1] = HEX_CHARS[buf[i] & 0x0F]; 
            } 
            return new String(chars); 
        } 
 
 
        public static byte[] hexToBytes(String str) { 
                if (str==null) { 
                        return null; 
                } else if (str.length() < 2) { 
                        return null; 
                } else { 




                        byte[] buffer = new byte[len]; 
                        for (int i=0; i<len; i++) { 
                                buffer[i] = (byte) Integer.parseInt(str.substring(i*2,i*2+2),16); 
                        } 
                        return buffer; 
                } 




        private static String padString(String source) 
        { 
          char paddingChar = 0; 
          int size = 16; 
          int x = source.length() % size; 
          int padLength = size - x; 
 
          for (int i = 0; i < padLength; i++) 
          { 
                  source += paddingChar; 





          return source; 





public class FObject { 
  
 public String status; 
 public String ip; 
 public String timestamp; 
 public String orgname; 
 public String address; 
 public String city; 
 public String state; 
 public String pcode; 







































public class Fail2Ban extends Activity { 
 String credentials; 
 MCrypt mcrypt; 
 String SERVER_URL = "http://10.31.7.11/student/paper2/"; 
 List<FObject> data; 
 List<CObject> cdata; 
 List<AObject> adata; 
 ListView lv; 
 
 @Override 
 protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
  super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
  setContentView(R.layout.Fail2Ban); 
  lv = (ListView) findViewById(R.id.listview); 
  mcrypt = new MCrypt(); 




  cdata = new ArrayList<CObject>(); 
  adata = new ArrayList<AObject>(); 
 
  if (getIntent().getExtras() != null) { 
   if (getIntent().getExtras().getString("type").equals("fail")) { 
    callFail2Ban(); 
   } 
 
   if (getIntent().getExtras().getString("type").equals("auth")) { 
    callAuth(); 
   } 
 
   if (getIntent().getExtras().getString("type").equals("cache")) { 
    callCache(); 
   } 




 public void callFail2Ban() { 
  try { 




   credentials = MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt("raqeeb")) + 
":" 
     + 
MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt("superman2")); 
   wr.execute(SERVER_URL + "/Fail2Ban.php"); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 public void callAuth() { 
  try { 
   WebRequest wr = new WebRequest(); 
   credentials = MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt("raqeeb")) + 
":" 
     + 
MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt("superman2")); 
   wr.execute(SERVER_URL + "/auth_log.php"); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated catch block 




  } 
 } 
 
 public void callCache() { 
  try { 
   WebRequest wr = new WebRequest(); 
   credentials = MCrypt.bytesToHex(mcrypt.encrypt("raqeeb")) + 
":" 




  } catch (Exception e) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 public void parseFail2Ban(JSONArray ja) { 
  for (int i = ja.length() - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 
   try { 




    FObject fa = new FObject(); 
    fa.status = job.getString("status"); 
    fa.ip = job.getString("ip"); 
    fa.timestamp = job.getString("timestamp"); 
    fa.orgname = job.getString("OrgName"); 
    fa.address = job.getString("Address"); 
    fa.city = job.getString("City"); 
    fa.state = job.getString("StateProv"); 
    fa.pcode = job.getString("PostalCode"); 
    fa.country = job.getString("Country"); 
    data.add(fa); 
   } catch (JSONException e) { 
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
  } 
  Log.d("test", "test"); 
  Fadapter fa = new Fadapter(getApplicationContext(), data); 







 public void parseAuth(JSONArray ja) { 
 
  ja = reverseJSON(ja); 
  for (int i = 1; i <= 20; i++) { 
   try { 
    JSONObject job = ja.getJSONObject(i); 
    AObject fa = new AObject(); 
    fa.log = job.getString("log"); 
    fa.timestamp = job.getString("timestamp"); 
    adata.add(fa); 
 
   } catch (JSONException e) { 
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
  } 
  AAdapter ca = new AAdapter(getApplicationContext(), adata); 
  lv.setAdapter(ca); 
 } 
 
 public void pareCache(JSONArray ja) { 




   try { 
 
    JSONObject job = ja.getJSONObject(i); 
    if (job.getString("blacklisted").equals("1")) { 
     CObject fa = new CObject(); 
     fa.blacklist = job.getString("blacklisted"); 
     fa.src = job.getString("src"); 
     fa.dst = job.getString("dst"); 
     fa.flags = job.getString("flags"); 
     fa.metric = job.getString("metric"); 
     fa.ref = job.getString("ref"); 
     fa.gateway = job.getString("gateway"); 
     fa.user = job.getString("use"); 
     fa.iface = job.getString("iface"); 
     cdata.add(fa); 
    } 
   } catch (JSONException e) { 
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
  } 




  lv.setAdapter(ca); 
 } 
 
 public class WebRequest extends AsyncTask<String, Void, String> { 
 
  @Override 
  protected void onPostExecute(String result) { 
   try { 
    JSONArray ja = new JSONArray(result); 
    if 
(getIntent().getExtras().getString("type").equals("fail")) { 
     parseFail2Ban(ja); 
    } 
 
    if 
(getIntent().getExtras().getString("type").equals("auth")) { 
     parseAuth(ja); 
    } 
 
    if 
(getIntent().getExtras().getString("type").equals("cache")) { 




    } 
 
   } catch (JSONException e) { 
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
  }; 
 
  @Override 
  protected String doInBackground(String... params) { 
   // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
   InputStream isr = null; 
   String result = ""; 
   long start, end; 
   start = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   try { 
    String credBase64 = Base64.encodeToString( 
      credentials.getBytes(), 
Base64.DEFAULT).replace("\n", 
      ""); 
    // create HttpClient 





    HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(params[0]); 
    httpGet.setHeader("Authorization", "Basic " + 
credBase64); 
    HttpResponse response = httpclient.execute(httpGet); 
 
    // receive response as inputStream 
    isr = response.getEntity().getContent(); 
 
    // convert inputstream to String 
    BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader( 
      new InputStreamReader(isr, "iso-8859-
1"), 8); 
    StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); 
    String line = null; 
    while ((line = reader.readLine()) != null) { 
     sb.append(line + "\n"); 
    } 
 
    isr.close(); 





    Log.d("output", result); 
    end = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   } catch (Exception ex) { 
    Log.d("exception", ex.toString()); 
    end = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
   } 
 
   return result; 




 public JSONArray reverseJSON(JSONArray ja) { 
  JSONArray newJsonArray = new JSONArray(); 
  for (int i = ja.length() - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 
   try { 
    newJsonArray.put(ja.get(i)); 
   } catch (JSONException e) { 
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 






















public class Fadapter extends BaseAdapter { 
 Context context; 
 List<FObject> data; 





 public Fadapter(Context c, List<FObject> listArray) { 
  this.context = c; 
  this.data = listArray; 
  inflater = (LayoutInflater) c 





 public int getCount() { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 




 public Object getItem(int paramInt) { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 







 public long getItemId(int paramInt) { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 




 public View getView(int paramInt, View paramView, ViewGroup 
paramViewGroup) { 
  TextView 
ip,timestamp,status,orgname,address,city,state,pcode,country; 
  LinearLayout messageView; 
  View localView = paramView; 
  if (localView == null) { 
   localView = inflater.inflate(R.layout.fadapter, null); 
  } 
  ip = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.ip); 
  timestamp = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.timestamp); 
  status = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.status); 
  orgname = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.orgname); 
  address = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.address); 
  city = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.city); 




  pcode = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.pcode); 
  country = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.country); 
   
  timestamp.setText("TimeStamp:"+data.get(paramInt).timestamp); 
  ip.setText("IP:"+data.get(paramInt).ip); 
  status.setText("Status:"+data.get(paramInt).status); 
  orgname.setText("OrgName:"+data.get(paramInt).orgname); 
  address.setText("Address:"+data.get(paramInt).address); 
  city.setText("City:"+data.get(paramInt).city); 
  state.setText("State:"+data.get(paramInt).state); 
  pcode.setText("Pcode:"+data.get(paramInt).pcode); 
  country.setText("Country:"+data.get(paramInt).country); 













 public String src; 
 public String dst; 
 public String gateway; 
 public String flags; 
 public String metric; 
 public String ref; 
 public String user; 
 public String iface; 





















public class CAdapter extends BaseAdapter { 
 Context context; 
 List<CObject> data; 
 private static LayoutInflater inflater = null; 
 
 public CAdapter(Context c, List<CObject> listArray) { 
  this.context = c; 
  this.data = listArray; 





 public int getCount() { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 







 public Object getItem(int paramInt) { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 




 public long getItemId(int paramInt) { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 




 public View getView(int paramInt, View paramView, ViewGroup 
paramViewGroup) { 
  TextView ip, timestamp, status, orgname, address, city, state, pcode, 
country; 
  LinearLayout messageView; 
  View localView = paramView; 
  if (localView == null) { 
   localView = inflater.inflate(R.layout.fadapter, null); 




  ip = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.ip); 
  timestamp = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.timestamp); 
  status = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.status); 
  orgname = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.orgname); 
  address = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.address); 
  city = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.city); 
  state = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.state); 
  pcode = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.pcode); 
  country = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.country); 
  timestamp.setText("Src:" + data.get(paramInt).src); 
  ip.setText("Dst:" + data.get(paramInt).dst); 
  status.setText("Gateway:" + data.get(paramInt).gateway); 
  orgname.setText("Flags:" + data.get(paramInt).flags); 
  address.setText("Iface:" + data.get(paramInt).iface); 
  city.setText("Metric:" + data.get(paramInt).metric); 
  state.setText("Use:" + data.get(paramInt).user); 
  pcode.setText("Ref:" + data.get(paramInt).ref); 
  country.setText("Blacklist:" + data.get(paramInt).blacklist); 








public class AObject { 
  
 public String timestamp; 
















public class AAdapter extends BaseAdapter { 




 List<AObject> data; 
 private static LayoutInflater inflater = null; 
 
 public AAdapter(Context c, List<AObject> listArray) { 
  this.context = c; 
  this.data = listArray; 





 public int getCount() { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 




 public Object getItem(int paramInt) { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 







 public long getItemId(int paramInt) { 
  // TODO Auto-generated method stub 




 public View getView(int paramInt, View paramView, ViewGroup 
paramViewGroup) { 
  TextView log, timestamp; 
  LinearLayout messageView; 
  View localView = paramView; 
  if (localView == null) { 
   localView = inflater.inflate(R.layout.aadapter, null); 
  } 
  log = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.log); 
  timestamp = (TextView) localView.findViewById(R.id.timestamp); 
  timestamp.setText("Src:" + data.get(paramInt).timestamp); 
  log.setText("Dst:" + data.get(paramInt).log); 
 









    xmlns:tools="http://schemas.android.com/tools" 
    android:layout_width="match_parent" 
    android:layout_height="match_parent" 
    android:orientation="vertical" > 
 
    <LinearLayout 
        android:layout_width="match_parent" 
        android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
        android:orientation="vertical" > 
         
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/textView1" 
            android:layout_width="match_parent" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:gravity="center_horizontal" 
            android:layout_marginTop="20dp" 
            android:text="Routing Cache" 





        <EditText 
            android:id="@+id/editText1" 
            android:layout_width="match_parent" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_margin="30dp" 
            android:ems="10" 
            android:hint="Username" > 
 
            <requestFocus /> 
        </EditText> 
 
        <EditText 
            android:id="@+id/editText2" 
            android:layout_width="match_parent" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_margin="30dp" 
            android:ems="10" 
            android:hint="Password" 
            android:inputType="textPassword" /> 
 





    <LinearLayout 
        android:layout_width="match_parent" 
        android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
        android:layout_weight="1" 
        android:orientation="vertical" > 
 
        <Button 
            android:id="@+id/button1" 
            android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:text="Login" 
            android:layout_gravity="center_horizontal" /> 
    </LinearLayout> 
     
    <LinearLayout 
        android:layout_width="match_parent" 
        android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
        android:orientation="vertical" 
        android:layout_weight="0.5" > 
 




            android:id="@+id/textView2" 
            android:layout_width="match_parent" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:gravity="center_horizontal" 
            android:text="D. Guster, L. Lebentritt and A. Raqeeb" 
            android:textColor="#000" /> 
 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/textView3" 
            android:layout_width="match_parent" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:gravity="center_horizontal" 
            android:text="Saint Cloud State University" 
            android:textColor="#000" 
            android:textSize="18sp" /> 
 
    </LinearLayout> 
</LinearLayout> 
Fail2Ban.xml 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<LinearLayout xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" 




    android:layout_height="match_parent" 
    android:orientation="vertical" > 
 
    <ListView 
        android:id="@+id/listview" 
        android:layout_width="match_parent" 
        android:layout_height="match_parent" > 




<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<LinearLayout xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" 
    android:layout_width="match_parent" 
    android:layout_height="match_parent" 
    android:padding = "10dp" 
    android:orientation="vertical" > 
 
    <LinearLayout 
        android:layout_width="match_parent" 
        android:layout_height="match_parent" 




        android:orientation="vertical" > 
 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/timestamp" 
            android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:padding="5dp" 
            android:text="TextView" 
            android:textSize="18sp" 
            android:textColor="#000" /> 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/ip" 
            android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:padding="5dp" 
            android:text="TextView" 
            android:textSize="18sp" 
            android:textColor="#000" /> 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/status" 
            android:layout_width="wrap_content" 




            android:padding="5dp" 
            android:text="TextView" 
            android:textSize="18sp" 
            android:textColor="#000" /> 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/orgname" 
            android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:padding="5dp" 
            android:text="TextView" 
            android:textSize="18sp" 
            android:textColor="#000" /> 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/address" 
            android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:padding="5dp" 
            android:text="TextView" 
            android:textSize="18sp" 
            android:textColor="#000" /> 
        <TextView 




            android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:padding="5dp" 
            android:text="TextView" 
            android:textSize="18sp" 
            android:textColor="#000" /> 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/state" 
            android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:padding="5dp" 
            android:text="TextView" 
            android:textSize="18sp" 
            android:textColor="#000" /> 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/pcode" 
            android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:padding="5dp" 
            android:text="TextView" 
            android:textSize="18sp" 




        
         <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/country" 
            android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:padding="5dp" 
            android:text="TextView" 
            android:textSize="18sp" 
            android:textColor="#000" /> 
        





    xmlns:tools="http://schemas.android.com/tools" 
    android:layout_width="match_parent" 
    android:layout_height="match_parent" 
    android:orientation="vertical" > 
 
    <LinearLayout 




        android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
        android:layout_weight="1" 
        android:orientation="vertical" > 
 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/textView1" 
            android:layout_width="match_parent" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_marginTop="20dp" 
            android:gravity="center_horizontal" 
            android:text="Routing Cache" 
            android:textAppearance="?android:attr/textAppearanceLarge" /> 
    </LinearLayout> 
 
    <LinearLayout 
        android:layout_width="match_parent" 
        android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
        android:layout_weight="1" 
        android:orientation="vertical" > 
 
        <LinearLayout 




            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_weight="1" 
            android:orientation="horizontal" > 
 
            <Button 
                android:id="@+id/button3" 
                android:layout_width="match_parent" 
                android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
                android:layout_margin="30dp" 
                android:layout_weight="1" 
                android:text="Reload" /> 
 
            <Button 
                android:id="@+id/button4" 
                android:layout_width="match_parent" 
                android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
                android:layout_weight="1" 
                android:layout_margin="30dp" 
                android:text="Cache" /> 
 





        <LinearLayout 
            android:layout_width="match_parent" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_weight="1" 
            android:gravity="center" 
            android:orientation="vertical" > 
 
            <TextView 
                android:id="@+id/TextView01" 
                android:layout_width="match_parent" 
                android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
                android:gravity="center" 
                android:text="Out Efficiency:" /> 
 
            <TextView 
                android:id="@+id/textView4" 
                android:layout_width="match_parent" 
                android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
                android:gravity="center" 
                android:text="In Efficiency:" /> 
        </LinearLayout> 





    <LinearLayout 
        android:layout_width="match_parent" 
        android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
        android:layout_weight="1" 
        android:orientation="horizontal" > 
 
        <Button 
            android:id="@+id/button1" 
            android:layout_width="match_parent" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_margin="30dp" 
            android:layout_weight="1" 
            android:text="Auth" /> 
 
        <Button 
            android:id="@+id/button2" 
            android:layout_width="match_parent" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_margin="30dp" 
            android:layout_weight="1" 




    </LinearLayout> 
 
    <LinearLayout 
        android:layout_width="match_parent" 
        android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
        android:layout_weight="0.5" 
        android:orientation="vertical" > 
 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/textView2" 
            android:layout_width="match_parent" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:gravity="center_horizontal" 
            android:text="D. Guster, L. Lebentritt and A. Raqeeb" 
            android:textColor="#000" /> 
 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/textView3" 
            android:layout_width="match_parent" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:gravity="center_horizontal" 




            android:textColor="#000" 
            android:textSize="18sp" /> 




<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<LinearLayout xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" 
    android:layout_width="match_parent" 
    android:layout_height="match_parent" 
    android:orientation="vertical" 
    android:padding="10dp" > 
 
    <LinearLayout 
        android:layout_width="match_parent" 
        android:layout_height="match_parent" 
        android:background="@drawable/gradient" 
        android:orientation="vertical" > 
 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/timestamp" 




            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:padding="5dp" 
            android:text="TextView" 
            android:textColor="#000" 
            android:textSize="18sp" /> 
 
        <TextView 
            android:id="@+id/log" 
            android:layout_width="wrap_content" 
            android:layout_height="wrap_content" 
            android:padding="5dp" 
            android:text="TextView" 
            android:textColor="#000" 
            android:textSize="18sp" /> 











$data = shell_exec($cmd); 
$data1 = explode("\n",$data); 
$data2 = array_slice($data1,2); 
foreach($data2 as $value){ 




 $arrayOutput['src'] = $output[$i][0]; 
 $arrayOutput['dst'] = $output[$i][1]; 
 $arrayOutput['gateway'] = $output[$i][2]; 
 if(count($output[$i])==8){ 
 $arrayOutput['flags'] = $output[$i][3]; 
 $arrayOutput['metric'] = $output[$i][4]; 
 $arrayOutput['ref'] = $output[$i][5]; 
 $arrayOutput['use'] = $output[$i][6]; 
 $arrayOutput['iface'] = $output[$i][7]; 
 }else{ 
 $arrayOutput['flags'] = "-"; 
 $arrayOutput['metric'] = $output[$i][3]; 
 $arrayOutput['ref'] = $output[$i][4]; 




 $arrayOutput['iface'] = $output[$i][6]; 
 } 
 $arrayOutput['blacklisted'] = parse_ip($output[$i][0]); 





function not_empty_string($s) { 





$ret = 1; 
$data = shell_exec('cat whitelist_rt.local'); 
$data1 = explode("\n",$data); 
 









foreach ($ips as $addr) { 
    if (strpos($ip, $addr) === 0) { 
       $ret =0;  










$cmd = 'lnstat -s1 -i1 -f rt_cache'; 
$data = shell_exec($cmd); 
$data1 = explode("\n", $data); 
$output = $data1[sizeof($data1)-2]; 
$result = str_replace(" ", "", $output); 
$data1 = explode("|", $result); 




$rtcache_in_tot = $data1[2]; 
$rtcache_out = $data1[8]; 
$rtcache_out_tot= $data1[9]; 
 
if($rtcache_in == 0){ 






if($rtcache_out == 0){ 































$url = 'https://android.googleapis.com/gcm/send'; 
$fields = array( 




                'data'              => array( "message" => $message,"message1" => $pid 
,"message2" => "jntu"  ), 
                ); 
 
$headers = array(  
                    'Authorization: key=AIzaSyA-
XeA33yWCWA_KHwQAfxah02cb7hrHPNo' , 
                    'Content-Type: application/json' 
                ); 
 
// Open connection 
$ch = curl_init(); 
 
// Set the url, number of POST vars, POST data 
curl_setopt( $ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url ); 
 
curl_setopt( $ch, CURLOPT_POST, true ); 
curl_setopt( $ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, $headers); 
curl_setopt( $ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true ); 
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false); 
 





// Execute post 
$result = curl_exec($ch); 
 











if (mysql_query($stmt, $con)) { 
     
} else { 










 $data = shell_exec("whois ".$ip." | grep 
'OrgNam\|City\|Address\|StateProv\|PostalCode\|Country'"); 
 $data1 =  explode("\n",$data); 
 foreach($data1 as $value){ 
 $data2 = explode(":",$value); 
 if(sizeof($data2)>=2) 


































error_reporting( 0 ); 
include 'auth.php'; 
//validateAuth(); 





$cmd=$cmd."| grep ". $_GET["query"]; 
} 
 
$data = shell_exec($cmd); 
$data1 = explode("\n",$data); 
$data2 = array_slice($data1,2); 
 
foreach($data2 as $value){ 
$output_1 = explode(":",$value); 
$timestamp_part = explode(" ",$output_1[2]); 
$timestamp = $output_1[0].":".$output_1[1].":".$timestamp_part[0]; 
 
$log = $timestamp_part[1]." ".$timestamp_part[2]." ".$output_1[3]." ".$output_1[4]; 
if(sizeof($output_1) == 6){ 




















$pid = $argv[1]; 








$pid = $argv[1]; 




















if (! pc_validate($_SERVER['PHP_AUTH_USER'], $_SERVER['PHP_AUTH_PW'])) { 
    header('WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="My Website"'); 
    header('HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized'); 
    echo "You need to enter a valid username and password."; 







function pc_validate($user,$pass) { 
 $mcrypt = new MCrypt(); 
 $username =$mcrypt->decrypt($user); 
 $password = $mcrypt->decrypt($pass); 
 $pass_md5 = md5($password); 
 























  $resultData['code'] = 200; 
 } 
 else{ 
  $resultData['code'] = 401; 
 } 
  





$host = "localhost:3306"; 
$username = "root"; 










    private $iv = 'fedcba9876543210'; #Same as in JAVA 
    private $key = '0123456789abcdef'; #Same as in JAVA 
 
 
    function __construct() 
    { 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @param string $str 
     * @param bool $isBinary whether to encrypt as binary or not. Default is: false 
     * @return string Encrypted data 
     */ 
    function encrypt($str, $isBinary = false) 
    { 
        $iv = $this->iv; 
        $str = $isBinary ? $str : utf8_decode($str); 
 





        mcrypt_generic_init($td, $this->key, $iv); 
        $encrypted = mcrypt_generic($td, $str); 
 
        mcrypt_generic_deinit($td); 
        mcrypt_module_close($td); 
 
        return $isBinary ? $encrypted : bin2hex($encrypted); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @param string $code 
     * @param bool $isBinary whether to decrypt as binary or not. Default is: false 
     * @return string Decrypted data 
     */ 
    function decrypt($code, $isBinary = false) 
    { 
        $code = $isBinary ? $code : $this->hex2bin($code); 
        $iv = $this->iv; 
 





        mcrypt_generic_init($td, $this->key, $iv); 
        $decrypted = mdecrypt_generic($td, $code); 
 
        mcrypt_generic_deinit($td); 
        mcrypt_module_close($td); 
 
        return $isBinary ? trim($decrypted) : utf8_encode(trim($decrypted)); 
    } 
 
    protected function hex2bin($hexdata) 
    { 
        $bindata = ''; 
 
        for ($i = 0; $i < strlen($hexdata); $i += 2) { 
            $bindata .= chr(hexdec(substr($hexdata, $i, 2))); 
        } 
 
        return $bindata; 


































 $queryStr = "insert into gcmReg set regid='$id';"; 
$result=mysql_query($queryStr); 
mysql_close($con); 
?> 
